5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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list which I had collected some time previously, namely the villages to which a person would go if he needed the services of a black magician, in other words, if he wished to apply *saruka* against a fellow villager who had injured him. When I pointed out this coincidence to informants they agreed that indeed they were always the same villages, but insisted there was no connection between *aguma* and *saruka embo*.

It is, however, the task of the anthropologist to explore such coincidences even if informants dismiss them as totally insignificant. In this exploration I was assisted by further facts, not noted by Williams, about the social exchange between the initiate and the *aguma*. Before the latter recites his war deeds, he will hand his limepot to the initiate. He then says something like: 'You are holding my limepot. Therefore promise not to beat your wife.' There are a good number of such vows the initiate must take. They no doubt vary a good deal from place to place, but generally cover a wide range of rules of social exchange, of the same type as are listed by Williams and by Chinnery and Beaver (1915: 76). Later, when the *aguma* offers the *otohu*, he does so *on condition* that the initiate keeps his vows. Persons who violate some rule of social behaviour are likely to be warned by fellow-villagers in terms such as: 'You had better be careful – you held the limepot.'

We thus find that *aguma* and sorcerer have something more in common than their provenance from the same set of villages. They are concerned with two interrelated aspects of social control: the *aguma* obtains certain pledges from a person and the sorcerer punishes that person if he breaks his pledges. It is significant that these guardians of moral values live in places which are on the fringe of the universe of friendly social relations maintained by any village. One may visualise this universe in widening concentric circles moving from friendly villages, to sorcery villages, to usually hostile villages. While the usually hostile villages tended to yield an occasional marriage partner obtained through abduction, the sorcery villages represent the outer limit of the area from which a person would ordinarily obtain wives, and therefore affinal and uterine kin.

It has often been remarked that guardians of moral values tend to be situated on the fringe of the social universe (e.g. see Gluckman 1965: 100–1). In view of what we already know of Orokaiva social relations (see model 20), we would expect that the initiand would normally have no direct significant social relations with his *aguma*. Usually his relations, if any, would be through one or more intermediaries. In the absence of such intermediaries, the initiand would see no reason why he should believe the *aguma's* recital of his war deeds nor his claims to greatness and why he should honour pledges made to a stranger. Williams shows that rude questioning of the *aguma's* authority, by young men in a position analogous to that of the initiand, was a regular part of the ritual (1930: 190). There is, however, a counterpart to these challenges which appears less clearly from Williams' account. I was told it was not enough for the *aguma* to protest his own war deeds; there must also be other war leaders present who will affirm that the *aguma* is speaking the truth. One gathers from Williams' account that there were two of these at the ceremony he attended (p. 189–90). He quotes one *aguma* as saying that these two intermediaries 'remembered his exploits better than he did himself'. The *aguma* then pretended to use these men as prompters. Whatever the two intermediaries were called upon to say or do,

A [See p. 135, Cat. 431--Analyst]

729 881 [537] they would always add credibility to the words of the *aguma*, as their authority would not be questioned by the initiand.

The effect of this ritual would be to place the *aguma* in a very exalted position. The initiand would see that someone he regarded as an authority figure deferred humbly and showed his admiration to the *aguma*. The *aguma's* social distance thus increased the awe initiands felt before him and made the pledges all the more binding. We may express this transaction by the following exchange cycle:

MODEL 31



754 626 [628] If the initiate should later break a pledge, the wronged person may call upon a sorcerer whose position I have suggested to be symbolically equivalent to that of the *aguma*. The Orokaiva never seems to use sorcery directly upon the person he wishes to punish, but always goes to a village on the periphery of his social universe, where he retains a sorcerer for a fee. Later on, when the victim of the sorcery (C) recognises the wrong he has done to the angered person (B), he will offer the latter some reparation. The latter will then ask the sorcerer (A) to cease pursuing the victim. We note that the exchange cycle thus set up is homologous with model 31:

MODEL 32



likely to emerge. Problems of work organization and income distribution may nevertheless arise.(1)

Problems of work organization: The communal plantations almost all involved several unrelated descent groups which traditionally recognized no single leader. The Orokaiva did occasionally form larger ad hoc groups for warfare and sometimes for forest clearing, but these were temporary associations directed to the achievement of a short term goal. This of itself does not preclude the formation of new and larger groupings with unitary leadership provided there is either a strong desire for group action (and the necessary institutions to direct it), or strong external sanctions to enforce it.

The earliest communal plantings of coconuts and rubber by the Orokaiva were carried out under instructions from officials and sufficient pressure was exerted to ensure compliance. The pressure was not, however, maintained and the coconut and rubber trees were little cared for after planting. Nor was harvesting for market enforced. Prices were low; the coconuts were seldom made into copra and the rubber was never tapped until the time of the war.(2)

The working of the coffee planted under the Native Plantations Ordinance was strictly supervised. A village constable was in charge of each local group, the European officer in charge patrolled the area regularly, and defaulters were severely punished. The communities regarded the whole operation as one of oppression by the government. During the period that government sanctions were reduced and finally withdrawn, coffee prices were high (more than ten times higher than immediately pre-war). Many people therefore wished to continue working the coffee gardens, but the community was not traditionally equipped with adequate sanctions to ensure that individuals did their share of work, and the law specifically forbade the exercise of sanctions by any indigenous individual or group.

(1) Since writing this we have been informed of a small (3 acre) communal tobacco-growing project which began at Soroputa in 1948 on the land of a single descent group. It was reported to have functioned efficiently until it was destroyed by the Mt. Lamington eruption in 1951.

(2) For details of the war-time rubber-tapping scheme see Rimoldi, 1964.

In his discussion of Orokaiva morality, Williams (1930:322) states that 'The group...contents itself with two main requirements - (i) material plenty, and (ii) internal concord. ...each virtue implies agent and reagent'. Three 'moral factors' are identified as working positively towards the achievement of this ideal: industry (the manifestations of which have been treated in Part II), liberality and helpfulness. A concern for mutual aid operates among members of the 'sympathy group' and is therefore only effective over a socially and geographically restricted area. Being an acephalous society, it is based on a reciprocal system whereby a prestation voluntarily made carries with it certain obligations and expectations.

In traditional Orokaiva society several types of prestations were identified, according to the scale, circumstance and nature of the obligation incurred, and many of them are still practised, albeit often in an attenuated form. The most common is termed oeiea - the informal daily distribution of small quantities of cooked food within the village. No account is kept of the volume involved but equal participation by all households is expected, the only exceptions being the aged and the single men, with the latter being called upon to reciprocate with a labour service from time to time. Such distributions are primarily the women's responsibility. However the casual gifts of areca and lime, made by the men, fall within the same category.

The term hande, freely translated as 'generous', is applied more specifically to ceremonial distributions and feasts organised by the men.[1] They are normally characterised by the participation of agnates and affines from other villages and by the strict attention paid to the apportionment of gifts according to considerations of kinship, status and specific obligations being acknowledged.

Visoare are challenge feasts of an avowedly competitive and hostile nature made in connection with unresolved disputes such as encroachment on land, or the stealing and unauthorised killing of pigs. They generally occur at the inter-, but neighbouring, clan level and incorporate the powerful sanction of shame for the individual or group challenged. The procedure is for the party levelling the initial accusation to hold a feast, invite the other, make a gift of food to them, and then challenge them publicly to reciprocate with a feast of equivalent scale. A failure to match it can only result in humiliation.

The type of gift made as a gesture of friendship or appreciation, but not normally reciprocated, is known as umbare. Such gifts are

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[1] See p.26 for a description of the circumstances under which feasts are arranged.

A,(See Category 574, p.26--Analyst)

tween sub-clans or villages.(1)

Officers of the Department of Native Affairs are still in some instances able to effect reconciliations or to settle disputes despite their lack of legal powers. This is not only because disputants are sometimes prepared to accept the judgement of a disinterested third party, but also because almost all Orokaiva people we have met are of the opinion that patrol staff do have the power to enforce their "recommendations". The fear of sorcery is still recognized as a sanction against transgression of property rights and informants quoted instances of sorcery having been used to punish transgressions of fishing rights. It is a commonplace that where adequate alternative facilities for settling disputes are not available, sorcery tends to increase. Though it is certainly extant in Inonda we have no evidence to indicate whether it is increasing or not.

The definition of boundaries and owning sub-clans would increase social stability and security of tenure, but in the course of time, due to population increase in some clans and decrease in others, it would become increasingly unrelated to clan needs. It is therefore necessary that any action to define boundaries and ownership should be associated with facilities for the transfer of rights between clans, or between individual members of different clans.

In the pre-contact era warfare was probably the most important means by which major areas of land were transferred between descent groups, and when warfare is abolished it is essential that alternative facilities for land transfer be provided. In many colonial territories where warfare previously tended to bring land areas into line with population numbers, colonial governments have abolished warfare but have not provided adequate alternative means of transfer, and this invariably leads

(1) Disputes between sub-clans or villages are sometimes settled by the Executive of the Higaturu Council. They have no legal power to enforce decisions, but they are often able to persuade parties to accept their advice.

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212 C visits every few days and counts cash, takes stock and places orders for supplies. D. manages his own store.

(592) Illiterate store owners are entirely at the mercy of their managers and it is for this reason that A and B have preferred to entrust the work to their sons, though this policy has not always been successful. As a result of management problems in A's store, management was transferred, with apparent success, to another son, but as B has only one son he feels he has no alternative but to persevere with him. C, being literate, can provide a sufficient check on his illiterate manager at least partly because the latter assumes that literacy gives the owner greater knowledge than it does. C formerly had a literate manager who falsified the records, but says the illiterate man has proved completely reliable since he began five years ago.

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452 All the stores have been closed from time to time owing to inadequacy of money to buy stocks. This has been due to the too liberal granting of credit,[1] personal use of store stock by the owner or manager, and the use of gross store income[2] for other purposes.

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434 All the entrepreneurs feel that trade stores provide more money for less effort than cash-cropping. For all except C this has not been the case in practice. In fact, it is likely that A and B have made little or no net profit on their total trading operations since their inception. They are aware of this, but feel that it has been due to difficulties which they now understand and which are therefore less likely to occur in future. For three of the four this is probably true, but all except C appear to expect higher future income from trading than is likely to eventuate. The stores are very small, turnover for the year 1965 averaging $956.[2] They buy their goods at a discount (inappropriately called 'wholesale') from European and Chinese retailers in Popondetta. Their turnover is too small and their knowledge of commerce too limited to enable them to buy wholesale from outside the district. Mark-up on goods has varied from nothing to 30 per cent and for a long time one of them was retailing at the nearest 10 cents above

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[1] Although they say they have a policy of not giving credit, all four have lost money from giving credit in the past. Three of the four find social pressures such that they continue to grant limited credit to close friends and close kin. In December 1965, A had about $60 unpaid credit outstanding, some of it of several months' duration; and two others had smaller amounts outstanding.

(626)

[2] Store turnover for the year for the four entrepreneurs was estimated from available records at $912, $500, $1,992 and $420 respectively.

permanent gifts of land: the populous mission village, if granted a permanent landed foothold, might well become excessively powerful and even oppressive. As long as the missionaries had only temporary tenure, their dependence on the villagers would always remain manifest.

No Orokaiva begrudged the mission teachers their special and high status derived from their office as teachers and preachers. While their duties were mostly with the school, they all gave occasional religious lessons in the villages. One teacher made such a visit to Sivepe nominally once a month, and always after there had been a serious village fight, thus helping the reconciliation of the combatants. There was an even more marked respect for the priest, deacon and AMO. This respect was expressed, for instance, when the village trade store at Sasembata villages, which usually operated on a fairly strict cash basis, was willing to give credit to mission teachers. (Regrettably, some proved slow payers.) There was also a convention whereby fights were promptly stopped when a mission teacher appeared and asked the combatants to stop. (The same taboo exists against fighting in the presence of cross-cousins of the category known as simbo.)

The coastal immigrants, however, aspired in addition to a general cultural ascendance. As one example of this, they liked to introduce among the Orokaiva their coastal dances and songs. The Orokaiva were avid pupils (as their culture history suggests they have been long before the days of Christianity). At the big dance held at the mission station in June, 1967, at least two entirely new dances, both of coastal origin, were introduced, one by the women of Sivepe and Kongohambo, and one by men and women from Waseta. In both cases, the teachers were missionaries from the coast. In both cases, the dance had never previously been seen in Orokaiva territory.

A significant source of power for the mission settlement was its indispensable role in the containment of quarrels not only within but also between villages. Sports matches tended to lead to fights, but they tended to be far more peaceful if they were held on the mission station. This was a place where people had to repress their anger. During my stay at Sivepe, several attempts were made to play matches in the village, but after two serious fights, people agreed with the priest's suggestion to play on the station in future.

Section 2: A Case History: Women's Organisations and the Mission

The following brief description of women's organisations in the Sasembata area, and especially Sivepe, will illustrate the general propositions concerning mission-village relationships set out in the previous section. There are no traditional women's organisations among the Orokaiva, though the women do certainly at times act as a solidary group in village affairs, especially when a husband is seen maltreating his wife. The other women will then club together with the wronged

wife, effectively shaming the husband. Today's organisations are sponsored by the government as well as the mission. The government employs a female "welfare officer," attached to the Department of District Administration at Popondetta, who is charged with the organising and supervising of what are cal'ed women's clubs. These clubs, set up in villages, are expected to follow a set programme, designed by the welfare officer, aimed at improving village hygiene, housekeeping and craft work. The women are also encouraged to play basketball at club meetings. They learn to sew, bake scones, etc., make bark cloth for sale, are given talks on infant welfare and generally learn Australian ideas about home care. Clubs are encouraged to buy sewing machines, instructed in their use and care, shown how to cut patterns, how to launder, and so forth. Courses lasting two weeks are given periodically at the Higaturu Council building, to which a number of selected officers of local women's clubs are invited. Usually these are presidents and secretaries of clubs. They are taught the various skills to be inculcated and expected to pass on theirknowledge in the village. The women are expected to persuade the men to build a meeting hall for the club. Money for the club is raised by regular dues, by the sale of bark cloth, and by the sale of cakes, scones and the like on club days. (The buying of ovens is also encouraged.) Inonda had such a club, built a club house in 1967 and had the use of a sewing machine. Kiorota had a club house, used not only by the women but also by the men when there were important visitors.

In the Sasembata district, the women's clubs became fused with their mission counterpart, the mother's union. The latter had existed from the early 1950's, and were accustomed to have prayer meetings, clean the church and the cemetery, sew for the hospital and carry out other church work usually allotted to women. The president of the mother's union was the pastor's wife, a woman of some ambition. For the convenience of the members of the mother's union, many of whom lived too faraway to attend regularly at the mission station, several branches were formed, in places such as Kendata and Puri, while the villages within easy reach (Sasembata, Sivepe, Garombi, Binduta, Kongohambo, Torogota) mostly attended the central branch. When the government founded the women's clubs, the territorial units covered by the clubs soon became identical with the areas covered by the branches of the mother's union. Furthermore, the club which included Sivepe and the mission station chose as its president the pastor's wife, as well as the same secretary, a young Sivepe women. The two organisations thus became identical in territorial boundaries, largely identical in personnel and rather similar in some of their activities. To mention but one instance, it was natural for the club to use the mother's union sewing machine for the club sewing programme.

The membership of the mother's union, in Sivepe at least, was somewhat larger than the membership of the women's club. The younger women were all active in both. Once a month they went to mother's union, did the necessary church work, cooked a common meal, prayed

124 really stood. In this, there may have been a certain hollowness;
177 I never saw among all the Orokaiva a young man who was as scared of his affines as this one. One reason why I employed the young woman as second interpreter was that nothing would induce him to open his mouth when I wanted to talk to his classificatory father-in-laws. In all significant respects, then, he offered little challenge to accepted tradition.

867 Children were trained by their parents in the prevalent system
869 of custom and belief, as modified by recent changes; they maintained
177 their traditional regard for their elders, not regarding their school knowledge as giving them any claims to superiority. Their elders did, as far as I know, make no use of the knowledge their children gained at school; my two interpreters were the technicians when letters had to be written or other newfangled problems solved. Everyone in the
621 village, including ourselves, were expected to fulfill reciprocal
571 obligations in the community; the acculturated young were certainly expected to help their kinsfolk, especially if their knowledge had
602 yielded cash. Even those absent on jobs in town were always asked (and occasionally expected) to help. There was only one partial escape from community obligations and that was to live outside the village. Migrants knew that whatever possessions they had amassed awy from home would soon have to be shared out if they returned to Sivepe. While they were away, they could more often refuse demands with impunity. But they knew that unsatisfied claims tended to be stacked up against their return. Some claims were purely try-ons. I have myself been the communicator of such claims from a Kongohambo man to his kinsmen in Port Moresby; I could see that the response to some of them was merely hearty laughter. But others, communicated at the same time, were taken seriously; some gift had to be made.

[626] The penalty threatening an absentee who neglected his kin had
[423] to be paid when that absentee returned; especially when that absentee wanted to resume possession of his land holdings. Little would it benefit him that certain lands had been left to him by his father, for during his absence, other men had been "looking after" them. If he had neglected these men, his rights would be hard to reassert; the community would give him little sympathy. If he had been generous during his absence, he could be strong in his claims; his relations would then show him benevolence. Rights could be kept warm only by constant exchanges; a moratorium of more than one year begins to be risky. While a man is in town, the exchanges seem unequal; money or clothes go to the village; some taro [illegible] sent to town (when I went to Port Moresby I was given a sack of these to carry, to be distributed by a knowing relative in town).

626 For those who remain in the village, the sanctioning mechanisms are mostly informal. Failure in one's obligations means loss of status, leads to gossip, derogatory remarks to one's face, perhaps even a harangue at night by a man at the other end in the village.

693 The councillor, the court and the police are only a last resort in serious quarrels. I saw a councillor enter a dispute once, playing a
627 mediating role between disputants from two villages, but without playing more than an advisory role. One quarrel was taken to court, but this was not a case where traditional mechanisms of social control
683 had failed. A woman accused her husband of adultery with one of the new Garoubi arrivals. She and the husband fought and had to be
626 separated as the lady had an axe; the domestic dispute soon died down but the Garoubi woman laid a complaint for slander with the police. Before this came to court, the wife had been roundly condemned by almost everyone in the village; she had repented, had gone round the village to signify her regrets, and been as contrite as her pride could possibly allow her to be. The court let her off with a reprimand. The episode, far from suggesting a flagging of Orokaiva traditional social control, had demonstrated to me that it was still effective.
177 Nonetheless, the Orokaiva, as so many other peoples in contact with
627 Western civilisation, have been quick to see the advantages of a judicial system providing an impartial arbiter in disputes, to whose decisions both parties will defer. At the moment, this western judicial system is an additional resource of Orokaiva law, without undermining its existing institutions.

25: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1974 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

571 But for most everyday purposes, the cooperative alliance is even smaller and does not extend beyond the three-generation family.

571 604 881 Relations with uterines, affines, and more distant agnates (that is, those beyond the lineage, and those who are resident in other villages) follow the pattern of competitive exchange. An example of what this implies would be the role of mother's brother as officiator at initiations. Elsewhere, (Schwimmer, 1970b) I show that ideologically, he is the proper person for the office, but that the father's brother and even the father would do as well. The mother's brother is not obliged to act; he is paid if he acts; furthermore he will act only if prior to an initiation, the neophyte involved has obliged his uncle by rendering him small services and being pleasant to him. Certainly the mo/bro si/so relationship is a warm affectionate one, but it is explicitly free from unconditional obligation. It is, in fact, the first formal relationship into which a person enters, where prestations on both sides are by free choice.

602 572 171 How can we explain that, at least in Sasembata, the Orokaiva classify guest friends with the sibling group (by applying the terms *apa/eambo* to them), whereas the Tangu use an affinal idiom? The answer is that siblingship has different connotations in the two tribes. Burridge (1969) emphasizes, above all, the amity that must govern the relationship between senior and junior siblings among the Tangu. If the junior sibling becomes unduly competitive, it is not held against him, but the relationship is redefined so that he becomes a *mwerkindang* – a competitor instead of a subordinate and protégé. The Orokaiva do not permit such a change in status; the younger brother must obey or sever his relations with his family. Moreover, the *apa/eambo* relationship is not confined to the cooperative alliance but includes distant agnates and all uterines within the exogamous group. A good deal of competition and exchange normally occurs between such kin, although the ideology of the *apa/eambo* relationship is basically that of a corporate group pooling resources for the support and protection of its members.

431 437 572 Secondly, the custom of classifying guest friends with siblings is not general among Orokaiva; the Sangara use the term *namei*. Furthermore, terminology is as much an ideological device as a reflection of reality. Use of *apa/eambo* means that people should behave *as if* they were siblings; that is, make free gifts instead of exchange gifts. These terms may be used when one seeks to extract a presentation from a comparative stranger, in which case they mean little more than an appeal *ad misericordiam*. In an hereditary friendship in which it is unusual to make claims, the terms signify that the gifts made to a visiting friend are not repayable but free. Certainly, it would [576] be considered wrong to press claims on the basis of such gifts. On the other hand, the host is expected (*not* merely permitted) to make a return visit, and [626] if he does not present gifts on that occasion, he will certainly be the subject of gossip and loss of reputation.

[558] In considering the manner in which these gifts are given, Sahlins'